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ABSTRACT 
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a 
standard concept in social choice theory.  However, this concept has serious 
drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash 
equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this 
problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant 
strategies, i.e., secure implementation.  We characterize securely implementable social 
choice functions, and compare our results with dominant strategy implementation.  In 
standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist 
Pareto efficient (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely 
implemented. But in the absence of side-payments, secure implementation is 
incompatible with Pareto efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a 
standard concept in social choice theory. Although it seems natural that an agent will 
tell the truth if it is a dominant strategy to do so, there are some problems.  First, 
announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy, and using the 
wrong dominant strategy may lead to the wrong outcome.  Second, many strategy-
proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong 
outcome.  Third, experimental evidence shows that some strategy-proof mechanisms 
do not work well, that is, very few subjects reveal their true valuations. For example, 
see Attiyeh, Franciosi, and Isaac (2000) and Kawagoe and Mori (2001) for pivotal 
mechanism experiments, and Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) and Kagel and Levin 
(1993) for second price auction experiments with independent private values. 
The first problem can be solved by requiring “full” implementation in 
dominant strategies. That is, all dominant strategy equilibria should yield a socially 
optimal outcome. This may require the use of indirect mechanisms. However, Repullo 
(1985) showed that if a social choice function f is dominant strategy implemented by 
some indirect mechanism, but f is not dominant strategy implemented by its associated 
direct mechanism, then the indirect mechanism does not Nash implement f. This leads 
to the second problem: mechanisms for dominant strategy implementation may have 
“bad” Nash equilibria.  For this reason, Repullo (1985) suggested that the concept of 
dominant strategy implementation should be replaced by Nash or Bayesian Nash 
implementation. We agree that the existence of “bad” (Bayesian) Nash equilibria is 
problematic. However, in the absence of a dominant strategy, a player’s best response 
depends on the other players’ choices, which may be hard to predict. This strategic 
uncertainty may lead to a failure to coordinate on a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. 
Moreover,  a problematic aspect of Bayesian Nash implementation is that it typically 
requires the mechanism designer to know the common prior of the players.     3
It seems clear that the standard concepts – dominant strategy implementation 
and (Bayesian) Nash implementation –  cannot provide a robust foundation for 
practical implementation. However, if a mechanism simultaneously implements a 
social choice function in dominant strategies and in Nash equilibria, then we get dual 
advantages.  First, with dominant strategies, strategic uncertainty is not important. 
Second, the mechanism implements the social choice rule in Bayesian Nash equilibria, 
for any common prior the players may hold. There is no possibility of getting stuck at a 
“bad” equilibrium.  
A social choice function is securely implementable if there exists a game form that 
simultaneously implements the social choice function in dominant strategy equilibria 
and in Nash equilibria.  Thus, all Nash equilibria should yield a socially optimal 
outcome.  We characterize securely implementable social choice functions: a social 
choice function is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness 
and a new property called the rectangular property.  We show that many quasi-linear 
economic environments with continuous private or public goods admit securely 
implementable non-dictatorial social choice functions that maximize social surplus. 
However, in a standard single-peaked voting model without side-payments, any 
securely implementable social choice rule must be either dictatorial or Pareto 
inefficient. This negative result holds even for multi-valued social choice 
correspondences. In a quasi-linear environment with a discrete social decision, such as 
whether or not to implement an indivisible public project, some interesting non-
dictatorial social choice correspondences can be securely implemented, but none of 
them maximizes the social surplus.    
Our hope is that secure implementation may lead to some progress on the third 
problem mentioned above, the rather negative experimental evidence.  We consider 
secure implementation to be a benchmark: if secure mechanisms do not work well in 
experiments, then there is very little hope that anything will work. But if a secure   4
mechanism works well in experiments while implementation using less demanding 
equilibrium concepts fail, then we may be able to pinpoint the reason for the failure by 
comparing with the benchmark of secure implementation. The question of whether 
secure mechanisms work well in experiments is investigated in a companion paper 
(Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom && && and Yamato (2003)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We give notation and 
definitions in Section 2. We characterize secure implementability in Section 3.  In 
Section 4 we discuss the relationship between non-bossiness, dominant strategy 
implementation and secure implementation.  In Section 5, we consider “robust” 
Bayesian Nash implementation.  In Section 6, we show the possibility of secure 
implementation in economies with quasi-linear preferences and divisible public and 
private goods. Sections 7 and 8 discuss the difficulty of secure implementation with 
discrete social decisions, and in the absence of side-payments.  Concluding remarks are 
in Section 9. 
 
2.  Notation and Definitions 
 Let  A be an arbitrary set of alternatives, and let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of 
agents, with generic element i.  We assume that n ≥ 2 .  Each agent i is characterized by 
a preference relation defined over A.  We assume that agent i's preference relations 
admit a numerical representation ui : A → ℜ.  For each i, let Ui  be the class of utility 
functions admissible for agent i.  Let u = (u1, ..., un ) ∈ U ≡ × ∈ iI Ui .    
 A  social choice function (SCF) is a function f : U → A that associates with every u 
∈ U a unique alternative f (u) in A.  
 A  mechanism (or game form) is a function g: S  → A that assigns to every s ∈ S a 
unique element of A, where S = × ∈ iI Si, Si is the strategy space of agent i.  The list s ∈ S 
will be written as (si, s i − ), where s i −  = (s1 , ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn) ∈ S i −  ≡ × ≠ ji Sj.  
Given s ∈ S and  ′ si  ∈ Si, ( ′ si , s i − ) is the list (s1 , ..., si−1,  ′ si , si+1, ..., sn) obtained by   5
replacing the i-th component of s by  ′ si .  Let g(Si, s i − ) be the attainable set of agent i at 
s i − , i.e., the set of outcomes that agent i can induce when the other agents select s i − . 
 For  i ∈ I, ui  ∈ Ui , and a ∈ A, let L(a, ui ) ≡ {b ∈ A | ua ub ii () () ≥ } be the weak 
lower contour set for agent i with ui  at a.  Given a mechanism g: S → A, the strategy 
profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of g at u ∈ U if for all i ∈ I, g(Si, s i − ) ⊆  L(g(s), ui ).   
Let Nu g( ) be the set of Nash equilibria of g at u.  Also, let NA
g (u) be the set of Nash 
equilibrium outcomes of g at u, i.e., NA
g (u) ≡ {a ∈ A | there exists s ∈ S such that s ∈ 
Nu g()  a n d  g(s) = a}.  The mechanism g implements the SCF f in Nash equilibria if for all u 
∈ U, f (u) = NA
g (u).  f is Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism which 
implements f in Nash equilibria. The mechanism g is called the direct revelation 
mechanism associated with the SCF f if S U ii =  for all i I ∈  and g(u) = f (u) for all u U ∈ . 
We will sometimes abuse terminology by not distinguishing between the SCF f and the 
direct revelation mechanism associated with f. 
 
 Let  a  mechanism  g: S  → A be given.  The strategy sS ii ∈  is a dominant strategy 
for agent i ∈ I of g at u U ii ∈  if for all  $ sS ii −− ∈ , g(Si,  $ s i − ) ⊆  L(g(si,  $ s i − ), ui ).  Let 
DS u i
g
i ( ) be the set of dominant strategies for i of g at ui .  The strategy profile sS ∈  is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium of g at u ∈ U if for all i ∈ I, sD S u i i
g
i ∈ () .   L e t  DS u g()  b e  t h e  
set of dominant strategy equilibria of g at u.  Also, let DSA
g (u) be the set of dominant 
strategy equilibrium outcomes of g at u, i.e., DSA
g (u) ≡ {a ∈ A | there exists s ∈ S such 
that s ∈ DS u g()  a n d  g(s) = a}.  The mechanism g implements the SCF f in dominant 
strategy equilibria if for all u ∈ U, f (u) = DSA
g (u).  f is dominant strategy implementable if 
there exists a mechanism which implements f in dominant strategy equilibria. 
The SCF f is strategy-proof if for all i I ∈ , for all uu U ii i ,~ ∈ , for all ~ uU ii −− ∈ , 
uf uu uf uu ii i ii i (( , ~ )) ( (~ ,~ )) −− ≥ .  The following result is well-known: 
    6
Proposition 1 (The Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation. Gibbard 
(1973)).  If the SCF f is dominant strategy implementable, then f is strategy-proof. 
 
The converse of Proposition 1 is not true: some strategy-proof  SCF’s cannot be 
dominant strategy implemented (e.g., Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979)). 
 
3.  Secure Implementation: A Characterization and a Revelation Principle  
We introduce the following new concept of implementation. 
 
Definition 1. The mechanism g securely implements the SCF f if for all u ∈ U, f (u) =  
DSA
g (u) = NA
g (u).1  The SCF f is securely implementable if there exists a mechanism  
which securely implements f.   
 
Secure implementation requires that for every possible preference profile, the f-
optimal outcome equals the set of dominant strategy equilibrium outcomes as well as 
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
  Next we characterize the class of securely implementable SCF's.  We use two 
conditions. The first condition is strategy-proofness. As Proposition 1 indicates, 
strategy-proofness is necessary for dominant strategy implementation, and so it is also 
necessary for secure implementation. However, an additional condition is also 
necessary for secure implementation. To see why intuitively, suppose that the direct 
revelation mechanism g = f securely implements the SCF f.  See Figure 1 in which n = 2 
and (,) uu 12  is the true preference profile.  Suppose  
(3.1)   uf uu uf uu 11 2 11 2 (( , ~ )) ( (~ ,~ )) = , 
                                                      
1 Secure implementation is identical with double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and Nash 
equilibria.  It was Maskin (1979) who first introduced the concept of double implementation. See also 
Yamato (1993).  Note that secure implementation can be regarded as multiple (more than double) 
implementation in dominant strategy equilibria, Nash equilibria, and all refinements of Nash equilibria 
whose sets are larger than the set of dominant strategy equilibria.   7
that is, agent 1 is indifferent between reporting the true preference u1 and reporting 
another preference ~ u1 when agent 2’s report is ~ u2 .  Since reporting u1 is a dominant 
strategy by strategy-proofness, it follows from (3.1) that 
uf uu uf uu uf uu 11 2 11 2 11 2 (( ~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ )) ( ( ,~ )) =≥ ′  for all  ′ ∈ uU 11 .  
That is, reporting ~ u1 is one of agent 1’s best responses at u1 when agent 2 reports ~ u2 .   
Next suppose that  
(3.2)      uf uu uf uu 21 2 21 2 (( ~ ,) ) ( ( ~ ,~ )) = . 
By using an argument similar to the above, it is easy to see that 
uf uu uf uu 21 2 21 2 (( ~ ,~ )) ( (~ ,) ) ≥ ′  for all  ′ ∈ u U 21 , that is, reporting ~ u2  is one of agent 2’s 
best responses when agent 1 reports ~ u1.  Therefore,  fu u (~ ,~ ) 12  is the Nash equilibrium 
outcome.  Moreover,  fu u (,) 12  is the dominant strategy outcome, and by secure 
implementability, the dominant strategy outcome coincides with the Nash equilibrium 
outcome.  Accordingly we conclude that  fu u (,) 12 = fu u (~ ,~ ) 12  if (3.1) and (3.2) holds. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 1
---------------------------------- 
 
  A formal definition of this condition, called the rectangular property, is given as 
follows: 
 
Definition 2.  The SCF f satisfies the rectangular property if for all uu U ,~∈ , if 
uf uu uf uu ii i ii i (( ~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ )) −− =  for all i I ∈ , then f (~ u ) = f (u). 
 
  A formal proof of the claim that the rectangular property is necessary for secure 
implementation is given as follows: 
 
Lemma 1.  If the SCF f is securely implementable, then f satisfies the rectangular property. 
   8
Proof:  Let g: S  → A be a mechanism which securely implements f.  Take any uu U ,~∈ .  
Suppose that  
(3.3)  uf uu uf uu ii i ii i (( ~ ,~ )) ( ( ,~ )) −− =  for all i I ∈ . 
  Choose a dominant strategy profile at ~ u, su (~)= (su su nn 11 (~ ),..., (~ ))∈DS u g(~).  By 
dominant implementability,  
(3.4)  g(su su nn 11 (~ ),..., (~ )) =  fu (~). 
 Let  iI ∈  be given.  Choose a dominant strategy for i  at ui , su ii () ∈DS u i
g
i () .  
Then  (su s u ii i i () , ( ~ ) −− )∈ − DS u u g
ii (, ~ ), where su s u ii j j j i −− ≠ = (~ )(( ~ )) .  By dominant 
implementability,  
(3.5)  g(su s u ii i i () , ( ~ ) −− ) = f (uu ii ,~
− ). 
By (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5),  
(3.6)  ui (g(su s u ii i i () , ( ~ ) −− )) = ui (g(su su nn 11 (~ ),..., (~ ))). 
Further, since su ii () ∈DS u i
g
i () ,   
(3.7)  g(Si, su ii −− (~ ))   ⊆  L(g(su s u ii i i () , ( ~ ) −− ), ui ). 
By (3.6) and (3.7), g(Si, su ii −− (~ ))   ⊆  L(g(su s u ii i i (~ ), (~ ) −− ), ui ).  Since this holds for any 
i I ∈ ,  (su su nn 11 (~ ),..., (~ ))∈Nu g( ) .  By Nash implementability and (3.4),  fu () = 
g(su su nn 11 (~ ),..., (~ )) =fu (~).  Q.E.D. 
  Next we show that strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are not 
only necessary, but also sufficient for secure implementability.  
 
Lemma 2.  If the SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property, then the 
direct revelation mechanism associated with f securely implements f. 
 
Proof:  By strategy-proofness, for all u U ∈ , f(u)∈DS u A
g ( ).  We will prove that for all 
u U ∈ , N u A
g ()  =  f (u).  Since ∅≠ ⊆ DS u N u A
g
A
g () () , that suffices to prove the lemma. 
Let uU ∈  be given.  Take any suNu g =∈ ~ () .  We show that g s f u () () = , i.e., 
fu fu (~)( ) = .  Since ~ () uNu g ∈ ,    9
(3.8)  ui ( fuu ii (~ ,~ ) − ) ≥ ui ( fuu ii (, ~ ) − ) for all iI ∈ . 
Further, since uD S u i i
g
i ∈ ( ) by strategy-proofness,  
(3.9)   ui ( fuu ii (, ~ ) − ) ≥ ui ( fuu ii (~ ,~ ) − ) for all i I ∈ . 
By (3.8) and (3.9), ui (f (~ ,~ ) uu ii − ) = ui (f (, ~ ) uu ii − ) for all iI ∈ .  By the rectangular 
property,  fu fu (~)( ) = . Q.E.D. 
 
  By Proposition 1, Lemmas 1 and 2, we have the following characterization of 
securely implementable SCF’s. 
 
Theorem 1.  An SCF is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and 
the rectangular property. 
 
  In the early literature on implementation, it was pointed out that even if an SCF 
f is implementable in dominant strategies, it may not be implemented by its associated 
direct revelation mechanism: it may be necessary to use more complicated “indirect” 
mechanisms (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979), Repullo (1985)). However, 
suppose the SCF f is securely implemented by some mechanism. Then by Proposition 1 
and Lemma 1, f satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property. Hence, by 
Lemma 2, f is securely implemented by its associated direct revelation mechanism. 
Thus, we have a revelation principle for secure implementation: 
  
Theorem 2. An SCF is securely implementable if and only if it is securely implemented by its 
associated direct revelation mechanism. 
  
The implication of this revelation principle is that we can limit our attention to 
the set of direct mechanisms. Direct mechanisms are somewhat natural and easy to 
explain to experimental subjects, which may add to their appeal.    10
 
4. Non-Bossiness, Dominant Strategy Implementation and Secure Implementation 
To further study the set of securely implementable social choice functions, we 
need the idea of non-bossiness. Intuitively, non-bossiness implies that no one can change 
the outcome without changing her own utility. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) 
first introduced a definition of non-bossiness for economic environments.2  For general 
environments, consider the following definitions. 
 
Definition 3.  The SCF f satisfies  non-bossiness if for all uu U , ′ ∈  and all iI ∈ , if 
f uu f uu ii ii (, ) (, ) −− ≠ ′ , then u f uu uf uu ii i ii i (( , ) ) (( , ) ) −− ≠ ′ . 
 
Definition 4. The SCF f satisfies weak non-bossiness if for all uu U , ′ ∈  and all iI ∈ , if 
f uu f uu ii ii (, ) (, ) −− ≠ ′ , then there is some  ′′ − u i  such that u f uu uf uu ii i ii i (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ ≠ ′′ ′ −− . 
 
The rectangular property is stronger than non-bossiness. 
 
Proposition 2. If an SCF satisfies the rectangular property, then it satisfies non-bossiness. 
 
Proof:  Suppose the SCF f satisfies the rectangular property, and 
uf uu uf uu jj j jj j (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′ = −−  for some j.  Let  ′′ u  be such that  ′′ = ′ − uu u j j (, ) . We need to 
show  f u f u () ( ) ′′ = . Now u f uu f uu uf uu uf uu jj j j jj j jj j (( ) ) (( , ) ) (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ = ′ = = ′′ −−− , and 
(, )(, ) ′′ ′′ = ′′ −− uu uu i i i i  for all i j ≠ . So we have ufuu ufuu ii i ii i (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ ′′ = ′′ −−  for all iI ∈ . By 
the rectangular property,  f u f u () ( ) ′′ = . Q.E.D. 
                                                      
2 Our definition of non-bossiness is slightly stronger than Satterthwaite-Sonnenschein's original condition, 
when applied to economic environments. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein’s original definition was that 
the SCF f satisfies non-bossiness if for all uu U , ′ ∈  and all iI ∈ , if  fuu fuu ii ii (, ) (, ) −− ≠ ′ , then 
fuu fuu ii i ii i (, ) (, ) −− ≠ ′ , where  fu i()  denotes the consumption bundle agent i receives at the allocation   11
 
Thus, any securely implementable SCF must be non-bossy. On the other hand, 
non-bossiness does not imply the rectangular property, even in combination with 
strategy-proofness (an example is provided in Section 6). However, it turns out that 
weak non-bossiness is enough to guarantee that a strategy-proof SCF can be dominant 
strategy implemented. Non-bossiness is a stronger condition than weak non-bossiness, so 
secure implementation is more difficult to achieve than dominant strategy 
implementation. For example, the Vickrey auction discussed in Section 7 satisfies weak 
non-bossiness, but violates non-bossiness.  (Notice that in general, weak non-bossiness 
does not imply that each player will have a unique dominant strategy in the revelation 
mechanism.) 
 
Theorem 3. An SCF is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct revelation 
mechanism if and only if it satisfies strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness. 
 
Proof:  Suppose the SCF f satisfies strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness. 
Consider the associated direct revelation mechanism. Suppose agent i’s true preference 
is ui. By strategy proofness, it is dominant to announce the truth ui. Suppose 
announcing a different preference  ′ ui  is another dominant strategy. If 
f uu f uu ii ii (, ) (, ) −− ≠ ′  for some u i − , then by weak non-bossiness there is  ′′ − u i  such that 
u f uu uf uu ii i ii i (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ > ′′ ′ −− . Therefore, announcing  ′ ui  is in fact dominated by 
announcing ui, which is a contradiction. Hence,  f uu f uu ii ii (, ) (, ) −− = ′  for all u i −  after 
all, so agent i’s lie (i.e. to say  ′ ui ) cannot ever affect the outcome. Hence, f is dominant 
strategy implemented.  
  Suppose the SCF f is dominant strategy implemented by its associated direct 
revelation mechanism. By Proposition 1, f is strategy-proof. It remains to show f 
                                                                                                                                                            
fu fu ii I () ( () ) = ∈  recommended by the SCF f for the preference profile u. Mizukami and Wakayama (2004) 
discuss the importance of non-bossiness for dominant strategy implementation in exchange economies.   12
satisfies weak non-bossiness. Take any uu U , ′ ∈  and iI ∈ . Suppose  f uu ii (, ) − ≠ 
f uu ii (, ) ′ − . Then announcing  ′ ui  is dominated by announcing ui when agent i’s true 
preference is ui, so that there is  ′′ − u i  such that u f uu uf uu ii i ii i (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ > ′ ′′ −− .        Q.E.D. 
  
  
5. Robust Bayesian Implementation without Knowledge of the Prior 
In the standard theory of Bayesian mechanism design, the agents are assumed 
to have a common prior over the possible states of the world, and the planner is 
assumed to know this prior. For example, in Myerson’s (1981) theory of optimal 
auctions, the optimal reserve price depends on the prior distribution. It has often been 
argued that the assumption that the planner knows the agents’ common prior is too 
strong (e.g., Bergemann and Morris (2003, 2004)). It turns out that secure 
implementation guarantees that the planner does not need to know anything about the 
agents’ beliefs. If strategy-proofness (i.e. dominant-strategy incentive compatibility) 
and the rectangular property hold, then if the agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
with any arbitrary prior whatsoever, the outcome will be socially optimal with 
probability one. Thus, the social planner can achieve implementation if the agents are 
Bayesian expected utility maximizers with a common prior, even if the planner is not 
sure about what the prior is. 
Let U be a finite set of possible utility profiles, and let q be a common prior 
distribution over U. Fix a social choice function  f U A : → . The direct revelation 
mechanism associated with f, together with the common prior q, define a Bayesian 
game. A strategy for player i is a function σii i U U : → , with the following 
interpretation: when player i’s true type is ui, then he announces σii u ( ). A strategy 
profile is a function σ:U U → , with the following interpretation: when the true state is   13
u, the players announce σ() u =( ( ), ( ),..., ( )) σ σ σ 11 22 uu u nn . Similarly, define σ−− ii u ()  in 
the obvious way. We will allow an agent’s beliefs about other agents’ types to depend 
on the agent’s own type. That is, after agent i learns his own preferences, he can update 
his prior belief using Bayes rule. If agent i’s true type is ui, the the probability that he 
assigns to the other agents being u i −  is denoted q uu ii i (| ) − .  
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is defined in the standard way. Notice that if the 
agents play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ in the direct revelation game, then if the 
true state is u, the mechanism will implement  f u (() ) σ . Given a prior distribution q, the 
direct revelation mechanism implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibria if the following 
two conditions hold: (i) a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ exists, and (ii) for any Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium σ and any u such that qu () > 0,  f u f u (() ) () σ = . Moreover, the direct 
revelation mechanism robustly implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibria if for any prior 
distribution q, the above two conditions hold. That is, robust implementation requires 
that the same mechanism works for all q. 
  We now prove that strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are 
necessary and sufficient for robust Bayesian Nash implementation by the direct 
revelation mechanism: 
 
Theorem 4. An SCF f is robustly implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibria by the direct 
revelation mechanism if and only if f satisfies strategy-proofness and the rectangular property. 
 
Proof: Suppose that f satisfies strategy-proofness and rectangular property. Since f is 
strategy-proof, the truthful strategy σ∗ = () uu  is certainly a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Now, suppose there is another Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ which is not truthful.   14
Take any u∗ such that σ() uu u ∗=′ ≠ ∗. We need to show that if q u () ∗ > 0, then 
f u f u () ( ) ′ =∗ . The Bayes-Nash property implies that  





















(| )( ( ( ) ,) ) σ  
for all i. By strategy-proofness, uf u u ii i i
∗
−− ′ (( ( ) , ) ) σ≤ ∗
−−
∗ uf u u ii i i (( ( ) , ) ) σ  for all u i − . 
Therefore, we must in fact have  
uf u u ii i i
∗
−− ′ (( ( ) , ) ) σ= ∗
−−
∗ uf u u ii i i (( ( ) , ) ) σ   
for all u i −   such that qu u ii i (| ) −
∗ > 0 . If each agent uses Bayes rule with the common 
prior q, then qu () ∗ > 0 implies qu u ii i (| ) −
∗∗ > 0  for all i. Therefore, 
uf u u ii i i
∗
−−
∗ ′ (( ( ) , ) ) σ= ∗
−−
∗ ∗ uf u u ii i i (( ( ) , ) ) σ   
for all i. But σ() uu ∗= ′, so 
uf u u ii i
∗
− ′′ (( , ) ) = ′ ∗
−
∗ uf u u ii i (( , ) ) .  
The rectangular property now implies  f u f u () ( ) ′ = ∗ . 
Conversely, suppose that the direct revelation mechanism robustly implements 
f in Bayesian Nash equilibria. Then it follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 that f is 
strategy-proof and satisfies the rectangular property: simply consider the special case 
of Bayesian Nash equilibrium when q(u) = 1 for some u, which corresponds to the case 
of complete information. Q.E.D. 
 
  By Theorems 2 and 4, we have the following equivalence result between secure 
implementability and robust Bayesian Nash implementability: 
   15
Corollary 1. An SCF f is robustly implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibria by the direct 
revelation mechanism if and only if it is securely implemented by the direct revelation 
mechanism. 
 
6.  Quasi-Linear Economic Environments 
Let the set of alternatives be 
  Ay t t y Y t i ni =∈ ∈ ℜ ∀ {( , ,..., ) , , } 1 , 
where yY ∈  is a social decision, and ti is a transfer to agent i of a private good called 
“money”. The set of possible social decisions Y is a convex subset of ℜk, for some k. (In 
the next section, we consider the case where Y is a discrete set). The cost of taking 
decision y (in terms of “money”) is given by a differentiable and convex function c(y).  
Each agent iI ∈  has quasi-linear preferences: 
  u y ttv y t in i i i (, ) = (, ) + 1,..., θ .  
Here vi is a valuation function which is differentiable and concave in y, and θi is a real 
number representing agent i’s “type”. For each i, the function vi is given once and for 
all and only the type varies, so the preferences of the agents will be represented by the 
profile of types, θθ θ θ =( , ..., ) 12 n .  The set of possible types for agent i is Θi . Let 
ΘΘ ≡×∈ iI i .  An SCF  f A :Θ→ recommends, for each profile θ, a social decision y f () θ  
and a set of transfers. Let ti
f () θ  denote the recommended transfer to agent i. Thus, 
fy t t t f ff
n
f () ( () , () , () . . . , () ) θ θθθ θ = 12 . The social surplus is defined as  
(6.1)  vy c y ii iI (, ) () θ ∈ ∑ −  
To avoid some technical issues, in this section we assume for all θ∈Θ , a unique y 
maximizes the social surplus (6.1). (This happens, for example, if each vi is strictly 
concave in y). A direct revelation mechanism  f A :Θ →  is a Groves-Clarke mechanism if 
for all θ∈Θ, y f () θ  maximizes the social surplus, and the transfer function is given by, 
for all iI ∈ , 






ii () ( () , ) ( () ) ( ) θθ θ θ ϕ θ =− + ≠ − ∑    16
Here ϕi  is some arbitrary function which does not depend on θi. It is well-known that 
Groves-Clarke mechanisms are strategy-proof (Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)). In many 
cases, for example if each vi is differentiable in θi and each Θi  is a convex set, any 
strategy-proof SCF that satisfies (6.1) must in fact also satisfy (6.2) (Holmström (1979)).   
  If the social surplus maximizing decision always occurs in the interior of Y 
(denoted intY) then the rectangular property is equivalent to non-bossiness. Both 
properties reduce to the following: no agent should be able to change the profile of 
transfers without changing the social decision. This is shown in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3. Suppose for all θ∈Θ, yY f () i n t θ∈  maximizes the social surplus.  For any 
Groves-Clarke mechanism  f A :Θ→ , the following three conditions are equivalent: (i) f 
is non-bossy; (ii) for all θθ , ′ ∈Θ and iI ∈ ,  f f ii () ( , ) θ θ θ = ′ −  whenever 
yy ff
ii () ( , ) θθ θ = ′ − ; (iii) f satisfies the rectangular property. 
 
Proof: (i) implies (ii).  Strategy proofness implies that if yy ff





ii () ( , ) θθ θ = ′ − . Non-bossiness then implies  f f ii () ( , ) θ θ θ = ′ − . 
(ii) implies (iii).  Suppose (ii) holds. Fix any profile θ, and letyy f ∗= () θ .  
Suppose u f u f ii i i (( , ) ) (() ) ′ = − θθ θ for all i. Since the surplus maximizing y is always 
unique, it is easy to see, using (6.2), that agent i desires y y = ∗uniquely. Therefore, if 
u f u f ii i i (( , ) ) (() ) ′ = − θθ θ then yy f
ii (, ) ′ =∗ − θθ . By property (ii),  f f ii () ( , ) θ θ θ = ′ − . Since 
y∗ is interior, and v is differentiable and concave in y, y∗ can be found by solving the 
first order condition for maximizing (6.1).  Since yy y f
ii
f (, ) ( ) ′ == ∗ − θθ θ , we have 
∂∗ ∂ = ∂∗ ′ ∂ vy y vy y ii ii ( , )/ ( , )/ θθ for all i.   
We know that  f f ii (, ) ( ) ′ = − θθ θ  for all i. Fori = 1, this yields 
f f n ( , ,..., ) ( ) ′ = θθ θ θ 12 .  The first-order condition for maximizing (6.1) must be satisfied 
at y∗ for profile ( , ,..., ) ′ θθ θ 12 n . Since ∂∗ ∂ = ∂∗ ′ ∂ vy y vy y 22 22 ( , )/ ( , )/ θθ , the first order 




n ( , , ..., ) ( , , ..., ) ′′ = ′ =∗ θ θ θθ θ θ θθ 123 123 . Property (ii) now implies 
f f f nn (,,. . . ,) (,,. . . ,) ( ) ′′ = ′ = θθθ θ θθθ θ θ 123 123 . By sequentially replacing each θiby  ′ θi  in 
this manner, we find that  f f () ( ) ′ = θ θ . Therefore, the rectangular property holds. 
(iii) implies (i). This follows from Proposition 2.  Q.E.D. 
 
Example 1 shows that standard assumptions often guarantee non-bossiness. 
 
Example 1: Production of a divisible public good.  
The public good is one-dimensional,Y =ℜ + . There are two leading cases that 
have been studied in the literature. Case 1:v y b y iii (, ) () θ θ = , where b is a strictly concave 
function. To guarantee that the surplus maximizing y is strictly positive, suppose 
′ > b () 00  a n d ′ = c () 00 .   Case 2: Let g(x) be a function which is strictly concave, reaching a 
maximum at x = 0, and suppose v y g y ii i (, ) ( ) θ θ = − . There is no cost of producing the 
public good, c y () = 0. This is the case of single-peaked preferences, where θi is agent 
i’s “peak”, i.e., his most preferred level of the public good. As long as all θi are strictly 
positive, the surplus maximizing level of the public good is strictly positive.  
In both case 1 and case 2 of Example 1, if yy ff
ii () ( , ) θθ θ = ′ −  then  ′ = θθ ii , so 
obviously  f f ii () ( , ) θθ θ = ′ − .  From Lemma 3 it follows that all Groves-Clarke 
mechanisms are non-bossy and will securely implement the social surplus maximizing 
decision.  
 
  Example 2 shows that corner solutions do not necessarily mean that secure 
implementation is impossible.  
 
Example 2: Allocation of a divisible private good in fixed supply.  
One unit of a divisible private good called “cake” is to be shared by the agents. 
(In addition, transfers of “money” are possible). The social decision is denoted   18
y y y yn =( , ,..., ) 12 , where yi is agent i’s share of the cake. Feasibility requires y ≥ 0 and 
yi i ∑ = 1. Valuation functions are of the form v y b y iii i (, ) ( ) θ θ = , where b is a strictly 
increasing and strictly concave function, satisfying b(0) = 0. Suppose Θi =[,] min max θθ , 
where  
(6.3)  θθ min max () > () ′′ bb 01 .  
Inequality (6.3) guarantees that the social surplus is never maximized by giving 
all of the cake to one agent. However, with three or more agents, it may be optimal to 
give no cake to some agent, so Lemma 3 does not apply.  The social surplus  θii i by () ∑  
is to be maximized subject to y ≥ 0 and  yi i ∑ = 1. Let λ >0 denote the Lagrange 
multiplier for the resource constraint. The maximum is found by solving the first order 
condition,  
(6.4)  θλ ii by ′ ≤ () ,   yi ≥ 0,  yb y ii i (λθ − ′( ))=0 for all i.  
Suppose the function ϕi in (6.2) is a constant, so the transfer of money to agent i is  




ji () ( () ) θθ θ =+ ≠ ∑ constant. 
We claim that in this case the Groves-Clarke mechanism satisfies the rectangular 
property. Indeed, suppose u f u f ii i i (() ) (( , ) ) θ θ θ = ′ −  for all i. This implies that for all i, 
either  ′ = θθ ii or agent i gets no cake, yy i
f
ii i
f (, ) ( ) ′ == − θθ θ 0. Therefore, the first order 
condition (6.4) still holds when θ is replaced by  ′ θ , without changing λ or y, so 
yy ff () ( ) ′ = θθ . Moreover, (6.5) implies tt ff () ( ) ′ = θθ , so  f f () ( ) ′ = θ θ  (recall that 
b() 00 = ). Thus, the rectangular property holds, and secure implementation is achieved. 
 
Example 2 illustrates the difference between implementation in strictly 
dominant strategies, and secure implementation. In Example 2, telling the truth is not a 
strictly dominant strategy, because an agent who gets no cake may still get no cake - 
and the same transfer of money - after a small change in his type. However, this does 
not prevent secure implementation, as long as the change in his type does not change   19
anyone else’s transfer. This is why ϕi must be constant. (If ϕi is not a constant then it 
can happen that tt ff () ( ) ′ ≠ θθ  even though yy ff () ( ) ′ = θθ .) 
If (6.3) does not hold, then the Groves-Clarke mechanism with constant ϕi will 
still be non-bossy. However, the rectangular property will be violated. Since one agent 
may consume all of the cake when (6.3) is violated, u f u f ii i i (() ) (( , ) ) θ θ θ = ′ −  implies 
either  ′ = θθ ii  or  yy i
f
ii i
f (, ) ( ) ′ == − θθ θ 0 or yy i
f
ii i
f (, ) ( ) ′ == − θθ θ 1. But this no longer 
ensures that the first order condition (6.4) holds when θ is replaced by θ’. Therefore, 
f f () ( ) ′ ≠ θθ  is possible. Intuitively, there can be bad Nash equilibria where one agent 
exaggerates his valuation of cake and receives all of it, while all the other agents report 
very low valuations and receive no cake.  Notice that this example shows that, in 
general, non-bossiness and strategy-proofness together do not imply the rectangular 
property. 
 
Example 3: Serial cost sharing.  
The social decision is y y y yn =( , ,..., ) 12 , where yi is agent i’s consumption of 
divisible “cake”. But unlike Example 2, now cake can be produced (using money as 
input). The cost function is cy C y i i () ( ) = ∑ , where C is strictly increasing, differentiable 
and convex. Each valuation function vi is strictly increasing and strictly concave in yi 
(but doesn’t depend on yj  for j i ≠ ). Moulin and Shenker (1992) define serial cost 
sharing and show that this SCF is strategy-proof and can be Nash implemented by an 
indirect mechanism. In general, the two properties of Nash implementability and 
strategy-proofness together do not imply the rectangular property (which requires 
double implementation by the same mechanism). However, serial cost sharing does 
satisfy the rectangular property. Suppose uf uf ii i i (( ) ) (( , ) ) θθ θ ∗
−
∗ =  for all iI ∈ . The 
definition of serial cost sharing implies  ff ii () (, ) θθ θ ∗
−
∗ =  for all iI ∈ . This implies that 
if yi




ii ( ( ), )/ ( ( ), )/ θθ θθ . If yi
f () θ∗ = 0, then 








j (() ,) / ( () ) θθ θ. In either   20
case,  ff () ( ) θθ ∗ = , so serial cost-sharing is securely implementable. Notice that in this 
example, there is no need for any assumptions that rule out corner solutions. 
  
7. Discrete Social Decisions  
The previous section showed that surplus-maximizing social choice functions 
can be securely implemented in many quasi-linear environments with divisible public 
or private goods. In this section, we show that secure implementation is more difficult 
if the set of social decisions is discrete. Consider a quasi-linear environment as in 
Section 6, but now Y is a finite set. For convenience, Y = {0,1}, and cc () () 01 0 = = . (The 
arguments can be adapted to any discrete Y.) We normalize so vii (, ) 00 θ =  for all θi. 
Thus, agent i’s preferences are characterized by vii (, ) 1 θ , the value to him of social 
decision y = 1. Without loss of generality we may suppose vii i (, ) 1 θ θ =  for all θi. We 
assume θi can be any real number.  
Notice that if by chance  iI i ∈ ∑ = θ 0, then both y = 0 and y = 1 are surplus 
maximizing. In this situation, it may be unreasonable to assume that the social choice 
rule is single-valued. Thus, we will allow f to be a multi-valued social choice 
correspondence (SCC). The definition of secure implementation when f is an SCC is the 
same as Definition 1. (Thus, we require “full” implementation in dominant strategy 
equilibria and Nash equilibria). Notice that for implementation in strictly dominant 
strategies, the issue of multi-valuedness would be moot because a strictly dominant 
strategy must be unique. However, in this paper we consider domination in the weak 
sense, and a given type of player may have several (weakly) dominant strategies. 
Moreover, even if each player has a unique dominant strategy, there may be multiple 
Nash equilibria (some of which are in dominated strategies). Secure implementation 
does not require a unique Nash equilibrium, but it does require that all Nash 
equilibrium outcomes are socially optimal (see Example 4 below).   21
We again use the notation  fy t t t f ff
n
f () ( () , () , () . . . , () ) θθ θ θ θ = 12 , but now y f () θ  
and ti
f () θ  are the sets of optimal decisions and transfers, respectively. The SCC f is 
surplus maximizing if  iI i ∈ ∑ < θ 0 implies y f () {} θ=0,  a n d   iI i ∈ ∑ > θ 0 implies 
y f () {} θ=1 . No restriction is imposed if  iI i ∈ ∑ = θ 0. For a mechanism  g SA : → , let 
gs y s t s gg ( )=( ( ), ( )) denote the outcome, where ys g( ) is the chosen public project and 
ts g( ) the profile of transfers.  
To see that some interesting social choice correspondences can be securely 
implemented, even with a discrete set of public decisions, consider the following “veto 
rule”.  
 
Example 4: A veto rule. 
Consider the following SCC. There are no transfers. The public decision y = 0 is 
always socially optimal. The public decision y = 1 is socially optimal if and only if 
θi ≥ 0 for all i. Intuitively, y = 0 is a “status quo” outcome which is always socially 
acceptable, but the social project y = 1 is acceptable to society if and only if all agents 
prefer it to the status quo. (With this interpretation, the SCC is the “individually 
rational” correspondence.) This SCC is securely implemented by the following 
mechanism. Each agent says 0 or 1. If all say 1, y = 1 is implemented. If at least one 
agent says 0, then y = 0 is implemented. Notice that the dominant strategy is to say 0 if 
θi < 0 and 1 if θi > 0. Both strategies are dominant if θi = 0 . There are no “bad” Nash 
equilibria, because each agent can “veto” the outcome y = 1. The “veto rule” is non-
dictatorial: for each agent i, there is a profile θ such that agent i strictly prefers y = 1, 
but the unique socially optimal decision is y = 0. However, it does not maximize the 
surplus, because y = 0 is socially acceptable even if θi > 0  for all i. We now show that 
in fact surplus maximization cannot be achieved in this environment. Notice that this 
negative result holds, even though we do not require budget balance (i.e.,  ti iI ∈ ∑ ≠ 0 is 
allowed).   22
 
Theorem 5. Consider the quasi-linear environment with Y = {0,1}. There is no SCC which is 
both securely implementable and surplus-maximizing. 
 
Proof: Suppose f is surplus-maximizing. In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose it is 
securely implemented by a mechanism g.  
Fix a type profile θ and choose sD S j j
g
j ∈ () θ  for each j. Surplus maximization 
implies that for any i, ys g() = 0 if θi satisfies  
(7.1)   θθ ij ji < ≠ ∑  . 
If θi satisfies  
(7.2)  θθ ij ji > ≠ ∑   
then ys g() = 1. Moreover, if (7.1) holds, then any sD S i i
g
i ∈ () θ  must give agent i the 
same transfer, say ts ts i
g
ii () ( ) = −
0 . (Otherwise, the strategy that gives the lowest transfer 
and the same public decision ys g() = 0 could not be a dominant strategy). Similarly, if 
(7.2) holds, then any sD S i i
g
i ∈ () θ  must give agent i the same transfer, say ts ts i
g
ii () ( ) = −
1 .  
Suppose θ is such that  θi iI ∈ ∑ > 0. Define a new profile θ’ as follows. For 
i∈{,} 12 ,  d e f i n e   ′ =− − < ≠ ∑ θθ ε θ ij i ji , where ε > 0. Let  ′ = θ θ ii  for all i > 2. For each i, 
choose  ′ ∈ ′ sD S i i
g
i () θ . Clearly,  ′ < ∈ ∑ θi iI 0. Moreover, for i∈{,} 12 ,  θ θ ij ji + ′ < ≠ ∑ 0.   F o r  
all i, we have chosen sD S i i
g
i ∈ () θ  and  ′ ∈ ′ sD S i i
g
i () θ . By surplus maximization, 
ys g() ′ = 0 and ys s g
ii (, ) ′ = − 0 for i∈{,} 1 2 . We now claim that, for i∈{,} 1 2 , if agent i’s 
true type is θi then  ′ ∈ ′ sD S i i
g
i () θ  is a best response against  ′ − s i. Indeed, choosing  ′ si  
would result in payoff ts ii
0() ′ − , because the social decision would be ys g() ′ = 0. But this 
is also what is obtained by choosing sD S i i
g
i ∈ () θ , because ys s g
ii (, ) ′ = − 0. Therefore,  ′ si  
is indeed a best response against  ′ − s i for i∈{,} 1 2  when his true type is θi. For all i > 2, 




i () () θθ . Therefore,  ′ ∈ sN g() θ .  But ys g() ′ = 0 even though 
θi iI ∈ ∑ > 0, which contradicts the definition of surplus maximization. Q.E.D.   23
Notice that the proof of Theorem 5 in effect replicates the proof that the 
rectangular property is necessary for secure implementation, and then shows that the 
rectangular property is violated.  
  To further illustrate the impossibility of combining secure implementation with 
surplus maximization in the discrete environment, we consider a well-known example. 
 
Example 5: Auctioning an indivisible object.  
Suppose the social decision is to allocate a private indivisible object among two 
agents. Agent i's true value of the object is θi ≥ 0 if she receives it, and 0 otherwise 
(i = 12 , ). Consider the second price auction (Vickrey (1961)). Suppose θ θ 12 0 >> . In 
order to maximize the surplus, agent 1 should win the object. Figure 1 shows that the 
set of Nash equilibria is quite large.  The lower-right part of the set of Nash equilibria is 
the ”good set” in the sense that agent 1 receives the object.  However, the upper-left 
part of the set of Nash equilibria is ‘’bad’’ in the sense that agent 2 receives the object, 
so the social surplus is not maximized. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Link to Figure 2
---------------------------------- 
 
8. Single-Peaked Voting 
Section 6 showed the possibility of secure implementation when the social 
decision is concerned with continuous variables, such as divisible public or private 
goods. However, the mechanisms relied on the existence of “money” for side-
payments. We now show that if there are no side-payments, the results are negative, 
even if the social decision is a continuous variable. 
Consider a single-peaked voting environment. The set of alternatives is A =[,] 01,  
and the set of possible preference relations consists of all those that are continuous and 
single-peaked on A.  Let p ui ()  denote the ”peak” of ui, i.e., the top ranked alternative 
in A, which is assumed to be unique. Single-peakedness implies that ui is strictly   24
increasing before p ui ()  and strictly decreasing afterwards.  Let Range f () denote the 
range of f. By Lemma 1 in Barberà and Jackson (1994),  Range f ( ) is closed. Let 
ax x R a n ge f =∈ min{ : ( )} and bx x R a n ge f = ∈ max{ : ( )} denote the smallest and largest 
elements in Range f () , respectively. Notice that f is constant if and only if a = b.  
In the single peaked voting environment one can find dominant strategy 
implementable social choice functions with good properties, the leading example being 
the median voter rule (see Barbera and Jackson (1994)). This SCF is both non-dictatorial 
and Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, if a Pareto efficient social choice rule can be 
securely implemented, then it must be dictatorial. This is true even if we allow the 
social choice rule to be multi-valued. Before proving these negative results for secure 
implementation, we will prove two lemmas. 
 
Lemma 6. Let f be a securely implementable non-constant SCF in the single peaked voting 
environment. There is an agent i and an alternative y Range f ∈ () , y a > , such that f u y () =  
whenever p u y p u ij () () ≥≥  for all j ≠ i. 
 
Proof:  Let  ′ u  be any profile such that pu a i () ′ =  for all i, and let  ′′ u  be any profile such 
that pu b i () ′′ =  for all i.  Strategy-proofness implies  f ua () ′ =  and  f ub () ′′ = , and b ≠ a 
since f is not constant. If  f uu a ii (, ) ′′ ′ = −  for all i, then the rectangular property implies 
that  f ua () ′′ = , but this contradicts  f ub () ′′ = . Thus, there is an agent, say agent i = 1, 
such that f uu a (, ) ′′ ′ > − 11 . Define y f uu ≡ ′′ ′ − (, ) 11 .  
Now let u1 be any utility function such that pu y () 1 ≥ .  Consider f uu (, ) 11 ′ − . 
If f uu y (, ) 11 ′ > − , then  ′′ ′ > ′′ ′′ ′ −− u f uu uf uu 11 1 11 1 (( , ) ) (( , ) ) , and if f uu y (, ) 11 ′ < − , then 
u f uu uf uu 11 1 11 1 (( , ) ) (( , ) ) ′′ ′ > ′ −− . Since in either case we have a contradiction of strategy-
proofness, we conclude that  f uu y (, ) 11 ′ = − .   
Now, for each  j≥ 2 , let uj be any utility function such that p u y j () ≤ . Consider 
f uuu jj (,, ) , 11 ′ − . If f uuu y jj (,, ) , 11 ′ > − , then u f uuu jj j (( , , ) ) , 11 ′ ′ > −  u f uuu jj j (( , , ) ) , 11 ′ − , and   25
if f uuu y jj (,, ) , 11 ′ < − , then  ′ ′ > ′ ′ ′ −− u f uuu uf uuu jj j jj j ( (,, ) ) ( (,, ) ) ,, 11 11 . Since in either case we 
have a contradiction of strategy-proofness, we conclude that  f uuu y jj (,, ) , 11 ′ = −  for 
all j≥ 2 .   
The rectangular property implies that f u y () = . Thus, f u y () =  whenever  
p u y p uj () () 1 ≥≥  for all j≥ 2.  Q . E . D .  
 
Lemma 7. Let f be a securely implementable non-constant SCF in the single peaked voting 
environment. There is an agent i such that f ua () =  whenever pu a i () = , and f ub () =  
whenever pu b i () = . 
 
Proof:  Without loss of generality, suppose agent i = 1 is the agent identified in Lemma 
6, and y the alternative identified in the same lemma. Let  ′ u be any profile such that 
top u a i () ′ =  for all i , and let ~ u  be any profile such that pu y i (~ ) =  for all i. Then f ua () ′ =  
by strategy-proofness, and Lemma 6 implies fu y (~)= . If  fuu y ii (, ~ ) ′ = −  for all i, then the 
rectangular property implies that f u y () ′ = , but this contradicts f ua () ′ = . Thus, there is 
an agent i such that fuu y ii (, ~ ) ′ ≠ − . Lemma 6 implies that in fact i = 1. Strategy-proofness 
implies  fu u y (, ~ ) ′ < − 11 .  Let zf u u y ≡ ′ < − (, ~ ) 11 . We will show that za = .  
It is impossible that za <  because ax x R a n ge f = ∈ min{ : ( )}. Suppose za > . Now 
let  $ u  be a profile such that pu z i ($ ) =  for all i.  Strategy-proofness implies fu z ($)= . Since 
zf u u = ′ − (, ~ ) 11 , strategy-proofness implies fu uu z ii (, $ ,~ ) , ′ = − 11 for all i > 1. The rectangular 
property then implies fu u z (, $ ) ′ = − 11 .  
Now consider fuu ii (, $ ) ′ −  for i > 1. Strategy-proofness requires fuu z ii (, $ ) ′ ≤ − . 
Notice that this inequality holds regardless of  $ u1, as long as pu z ($ ) 1 = . Moreover, 
fuu ii (, $ ) ′ −  is in fact the same alternative for any  $ u1 such that top u z ($ ) 1 = . (Otherwise, 
there would exist  $ u1 and u1 such that pu pu z ($ )( ) 11 = = , and fu uu ii ($ ,, $ ) , 11 ′ < −  
fu uu z ii (,, $ ) , 11 ′ ≤ − . But then  $ (( $ ,, $ )) , uf uu u ii 11 1 ′ < − $ (( , , $ )) , uf uu u ii 11 1 ′ − , contradicting 
strategy-proofness.)  Suppose wf u u zy ii ≡ ′ << − (, $ ) .  But now consider  $ u1 such that   26
pu z ($ ) 1 =  and  $ () $ () uy uw 11 > .  Lemma 6 implies that if pu y (~ ) 1 = , then  fu uu y ii (~ ,, $ ) , 11 ′ = − .  
But since  $ () $ () uy uw 11 >  and wf u u ii = ′ − (, $ ), strategy-proofness is violated. This 
contradiction implies  fuu z ii (, $ ) ′ = −  for all i > 1. Since we already have established 
fu u z (, $ ) ′ = − 11 , we can apply the rectangular property and conclude that f uz () ′ = . 
However, f ua () ′ = , a contradiction of our hypothesis that za > . So, we must have 
za = .   
The previous paragraph established that  fu u a (, ~ ) ′ = − 11  whenever p ua () ′ = 1  and 
pu y i (~ ) = for all i > 1. Now for all i > 1, let ~ ui be such that pu y i (~ ) = , and ~ () ~ () ux ua ii >  
for all xR a n ge f ∈ ()  s u c h  t h a t  xa > . Consider any agent i > 1 and any arbitrary ui. If 
fu uu a ii (,, ~ ) , ′ ≠ − 11, then ~ (( , , ~ )) ~ (( , ~ ,~ )) ,, uf uuu uf uuu ii i ii i ′ > ′ −− 11 11 , which contradicts 
strategy-proofness.  Hence, fu uu a ii (,, ~ ) , ′ = − 11 for all i > 1. The rectangular property 
implies f uu a (, ) ′ = − 11 .  We conclude that f uu a (, ) ′ = − 11  whenever pu a () ′ = 1 .  
Exactly the same line of reasoning establishes the existence of an agent i such 
that  f uu b ii (, ) ′ = −  whenever pu b i () ′ = . Obviously, this must be i = 1, or else we 
contradict the already established fact that  f uu a (, ) ′ = − 11  whenever pu a () ′ = 1 . Q.E.D.  
 
  Now we are ready to prove our first negative result for single peaked voting. It 
covers the case of single-valued social choice rules. 
 
Theorem 7. Let f be a securely implementable SCF in the single peaked voting environment. 
There is a dictator on Range f () , i.e., an agent i such that for all u and allx Range f ∈ () , 
u f u i(() ) ≥ ux i() . 
 
Proof:  Since the result is trivial if f is constant, suppose f is securely implementable but 
not constant. Lemma 7 identifies an agent i such that f ua () =  whenever pu a i () = , 
and f ub () =  whenever p ub i () = . Without loss of generality suppose this is true for i =   27
1. Fix any xR a n ge f ∈ () .  Let  ′ u be such that p ux i () ′ = for all i, and let u be an arbitrary 
profile. The theorem is proved by showing that  f uu x (, ) ′ = − 11  must necessarily hold.  
Strategy-proofness implies f ux () ′ = . Fix any i > 1. We will show that 
f uu x ii (, ) ′ = − . If p ux i () = , then f uu x ii (, ) ′ = −  by strategy-proofness.  Suppose instead 
that pu x i () > . Then strategy-proofness implies f uu x ii (, ) ′ ≥ − . Notice that this inequality 
holds regardless of  ′ u1, as long as pu x () ′ = 1 . Moreover,  f uu ii (, ) ′ −  is in fact the same 
alternative for any  ′ u1 such that p ux () ′ = 1 . (Otherwise, there would exist  ′ u1 and  ′′ u1  
such that pu pu x () () ′ = ′′ = 11 , and  f uuu ii (,, ) , ′ ′ > − 11 f uuu x ii (,, ) , ′′ ′ ≥ − 11. But then 
′′ ′< ′′ ′′ −− u f uuu uf uuu ii ii 11 1 11 1 (( , , ) ) (( , , ) ) ,, , contradicting strategy-proofness.)  
Now suppose z f uu x ii ≡ ′ > − (, ) . But consider  ′ u1  such that pu x () ′ = 1 , and 
′ > ′ ua uz 11 ( ) ( ).  If ~ u1  is such that pu a (~ ) 1 = , then  fu uu a ii (~ ,, ) , 11 ′ = −  by Lemma 8. But then 
′′ > ′′ ′ −− uf uu u uf uu u ii ii 11 1 11 1 (( ~ ,, ) ) ( (,, ) ) ,, , contradicting strategy-proofness. This 
contradiction shows that we must have  f uu x ii (, ) ′ = −  whenever pu x i () > . A similar 
argument establishes that  f uu x ii (, ) ′ = −  whenever pu x i () < . We conclude that, for all 
i > 1,  f uu x ii (, ) ′ = −  for all ui. The rectangular property implies  f uu x (, ) ′ = − 11 .  Q.E.D. 
 
  As in the previous section, there exist non-dictatorial social choice 
correspondences that can be securely implemented. For example, a “veto rule”, similar 
to Example 4, with some arbitrary alternative designated as status quo, can be securely 
implemented in the single-peaked voting model. However, this SCC is not Pareto 
efficient. More generally, in this environment an SCC is either single-valued, in which 
case it must be dictatorial by Theorem 7, or it is Pareto inefficient. This is our second 
negative result for single-peaked voting.  
 
Theorem 8. Let f be a securely implementable SCC in the single peaked voting environment. 
Then f is either single-valued or Pareto inefficient.  
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Proof: Suppose f is a securely implementable SCC which is not single-valued. Then 
there is u such that f(u) contains at least two distinct alternatives. If f is securely 
implemented by mechanism g, then there must be two strategy profiles ss D S u g ,( ) ′ ∈  
such that  g s g s () ( ) ≠ ′ . Then, there must necessarily exist alternatives a and b, and an 
agent i, such that  g ss s s sa iii n (, ) = ′′ −+ 11 ,..., , ,...,  but  g ss s s s b a iii n (, ) = ′ ′ ′ ≠ −+ 11 ,..., , ,..., . We 
may choose labeling so that i = 1, and ba > .  
Thus, we have sD Su g ∈ () ,  g sa () = , (, ) ( ) ′ ∈ − ss D Su g
11  and  g ss ba (, ) ′ => − 11 . 
Since ss D Su
g
11 1 1 ,( ) ′ ∈ , it must be the case that a p ub < < () 1  and ua ub 11 () () = .  
Let L j p ua j ={ : ( ) } ≤  be the set of agents whose peaks, in the profile u, are 
(weakly) to the left of a. Suppose 2 ∈L , and suppose u2
∗ is such that ap u b << ∗ () 2  and 
ua ub 22
∗∗ > () () .  L e t  sD S u
g
2 2 2
∗∗ ∈ () .   
Claim:  gs s s a () = 12 1 2 ,, ,
∗
− . 
To prove the claim, we consider the various possibilities. 
Case 1: ag sss b < ∗
− () < 12 1 2 ,, , . Since ss D Su
g
11 1 1 ,( ) ′ ∈ , we must have 
ug sss ug sss 11 2 1 2 11 2 1 2 (, , (, , ,, () ) = () ) ∗
−
∗
− ′ . Therefore, ag sss b < ′ ∗
− () < 12 1 2 ,, , . But 
g sss b (,, ) , ′ = − 12 1 2  and 2 ∈L , so ug sss ug sss 21 2 1 2 21 2 1 2 (, , (, , ,, () ) > () ) ′′ ∗
−− . However, this 
contradicts sD S u
g
2 2 2 ∈ ( ). Therefore, case 1 is impossible.  
Case 2:  gs s s a gs () < 12 1 2 ,, ( ) ,
∗
− = . This case is impossible because pu a () 2




∗∗ ∈ () .  
Case 3:  gs s s b () 12 1 2 ,, ,
∗
− ≥ . But then, ug s ub ug sss 22 2 1 2 1 2
∗∗ ∗ ∗
− >≥ (() ) () ( , , , () ) ,  w h i c h  
contradicts sD S u
g
2 2 2
∗∗ ∈ () .   
Since cases 1,2 and 3 are all impossible, the claim is true.  
The claim establishes  gs s s a () = 12 1 2 ,, ,
∗
− .  Since ss D Su
g
11 1 1 ,( ) ′ ∈ , it must be the 
case that ug sss ua 11 2 1 2 1 (, , ( ) , () ) ′ = ∗
− . This means that gs s s () ′ ∗
− 12 1 2 ,, ,  can be either a or b. 
Suppose  gs s s a () = ′ ∗
− 12 1 2 ,, , . But,  g ss b () = ′ − 11 ,.  S i n c e  2 ∈L  we have ua ub 22 () () > , which 
contradicts sD S u
g
2 2 2 ∈ ( ). Therefore, we must have  gs s s b () = ′ ∗
− 12 1 2 ,, , .   29





− ∈ ,  gs s a (, ) 22
∗
− = , 
(,, ) (, ) , ′ ∈ ∗
−
∗
− sss D Suu g
12 1 2 2 2 and  gs s s b a () = ′ > ∗
− 12 1 2 ,, , . This puts us back in our original 
position, except that the L set has one fewer member after u2 is replaced by u2
∗ 
(because pu a () 2
∗ > ). We can repeat the same argument for each  j L ∈ : we let uj
∗ be such 
that ap u b << ∗ () 2  and ua ub jj
∗∗ > () () ,  a n d  w e  p i c k  sD S u j j
g
j
∗∗ ∈ ( ).  After having exhausted 
all the members of L, we obtain ss Lj j L
∗∗
∈ = { } , where sD S u j j
g
j
∗∗ ∈ ()  f o r  e a c h   j L ∈ , and 
gs s a LL (, ) −
∗ = . Since g securely implements f, af u u LL ∈ −
∗ (, ) . However, by definition of L, 
when the utility profile is ( , ) uu LL −
∗ , all agents have peaks strictly to the right of a. 
Therefore, a is not Pareto efficient. Q.E.D.  
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
Many researchers believe that if truth telling is a dominant strategy, then every 
agent will adopt it.  However, we believe this issue should be decided by experiments. 
In Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom && && and Yamato (2003), we conducted experiments on two 
strategy-proof mechanisms: the pivotal mechanism with two agents and a binary 
public project that has a continuum of Nash equilibria, and a Groves-Clarke 
mechanism with two agents and single-peaked preferences that has a unique Nash 
equilibrium. We found that subjects played dominant strategies significantly more 
frequently in the secure Groves mechanism than in the non-secure pivotal mechanism. 
This makes us optimistic about the future of mechanism design. The negative 
experimental evidence mentioned in the introduction was based on mechanisms that 
are not secure (such as the second price auction). In these experiments, there may have 
been insufficient pressure on the players to adopt their dominant strategies, and 
deviations may not have been punished by big payoff losses (for a discussion, see 
Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom && && and Yamato (2003)). Imposing stricter requirements than simply 
strategy-proofness may turn out to be the key to successful applications of mechanism 
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Figure 2: Equilibria of the Second Price Auction
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